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I.

INTRODUCTION

It was March 31, 2001, and tension was mounting in Belgrade, the
capital of Serbia.' Slobodan Milosevic, the former Yugoslavian president, had
been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2 on an array of war crimes arising from the horrific
atrocities that had produced thousands of deaths during the Balkan wars of the
1990s in Croatia, Bosnia, and the Serbian province of Kosovo. 3 The United
States had imposed a March 31, 2001, deadline upon the Yugoslavian
government to arrest Milosevic so that he could be tried before the ICTY.4
Failure to comply with the deadline would result in the loss to Yugoslavia of
Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law; A.B., Duke
t
University, 1983; MPA, Columbia University, 1985; J.D., University of Virginia, 1988. I would like to
thank Nancy Combs, Tara Duhy, Ivan Krmpotic, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, Leon Lysaght, Elliot
Meyrowitz, Dragomir Modrusan, Geoffrey Watson, and Margaret Casman-Vuko for their many helpful
comments and their assistance throughout the preparation of this Article. I also want to extend my
thanks to Jane Edwards, Janet Hedin, Kate Hushke, Kisuk Paek, Kathy Prince, Diab Rizk, Harry
Rosenthal, Michael Wilson, and the entire Michigan State University College of Law Library team for
their tremendous research assistance. Finally, I would like to extend a special thank you to my wife,
Robin, for her invaluable contributions throughout the preparation of this Article.
1.
See Powell Adds Stop in Serbia to Lightning Trip to Turkey, Belgium, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, Apr. 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2768735.
The ICTY was created in 1993 and is located in The Hague, The Netherlands. See G.A.
2.
Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/808 (1993); Nancy Amoury Combs,
Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargainingof International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 61
(2002).
3.
See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-02-54-T, paras. 32-45
(Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Apr. 21, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai040421-e.htm; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, First Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-02-54-T,
paras. 34-83 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 23, 2002),
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-aiO21023.htm; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Second Amended
Indictment, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, paras. 62-68 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Oct. 29, 2001), http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-2a011029e.htm; Slobodan Milosevic:
Reversal of Fortune, CNN.com, at http://www.archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/04/milosevic.reversal/index.html (Apr. 24, 2002).
See R. Jeffrey Smith, Milosevic Is Arrested by Serb Police, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2001, at
4.
Al, A25.
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millions of dollars of economic aid from the United States as well as financial
support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.5 After two
failed attempts by the Yugoslavian police to remove Milosevic forcibly from
the residential villa 6 where he had been residing since his removal from the
presidency in September 2000, 7 the Yugoslavian government was faced with a
delicate quandary: how to appease American wishes yet maintain internal
order. Milosevic and his loyalists, who were armed with anti-tank
grenades
9
and machine guns, seemed poised for a violent confrontation.
Yet, to the surprise of many, during the early morning hours of April 1,
2001, Milosevic was arrested peacefully and without resistance. 10 Though
initially inclined to resist extradition to The Hague and to try Milosevic
domestically,' Yugoslavian authorities eventually relented and permitted his
transfer to the ICTY, 12 where his trial is still in progress. Milosevic,
undoubtedly, is the main attraction at The Hague. Accused of more than sixty
war crimes, the former president is alleged to have either directly ordered or
encouraged the ethnic cleansing activities that resulted in countless deaths,
rapes, and displacements sustained by Yugoslavia's Croat, Muslim, and ethnic
Albanian populations. 14 While the Milosevic trial is certainly the ICTY's most
notorious, another controversial development has recently emerged that has
5.
Id.; see also Milosevic Arrested, Faces Trial, NewsMax.com, at http://newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/3/30/204936.shtml (Mar. 31, 2001).
6.
Smith, supra note 4, at A25.
7.
Id.
8.
Despite a broad consensus in the government that the arrest should be carried out
peacefully, several officials said they had become convinced on Saturday of the need to
act quickly to enforce the arrest warrant. The officials expressed concern that Milosevic's
strategy was to buy time and try to stoke political tensions that would impede his arrest.
Officials also said they worried that radical military veterans loyal to Milosevic might
converge on the scene, further complicating an arrest that foreign governments have said
they expected Yugoslavia to achieve peacefully.
Id.
9.
Id.
10. See id.
11.
See Alex Todorovic, Milosevic Is Arrested as Belgrade Rejoices, Telegraph.co.uk, at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/O3/31/wmil31.xml(Mar. 31, 2001); see
also Smith, supranote 4.
12. See Joseph Lelyveld, The Defendant; Slobodan Milosevic's Trial, and the Debate
Surrounding International Courts, NEW YORKER, May 27, 2002, at 82 (noting that "the Serb
government, which coexists with a federal Yugoslav Government, handed Milosevic over to the
Tribunal"); Anthony Deutsch, Milosevic Handedto Crimes Tribunal, COLUMBIAN, June 29, 2001, at Al
(indicating that Milosevic was transferred to the ICTY on June 28, 2001).
13.
Case Against Milosevic Set to End, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/02/12/milosevic.trial.reut/ (Feb. 12, 2004) (stating that although the prosecution's case
against Milosevic was set to end on February 19, 2004, the trial itself could last until 2006).
14. With respect to the Bosnian conflict, the indictment charges Milosevic with two counts of
Genocide or Complicity in Genocide, ten counts of Crimes Against Humanity, eight counts of Grave
Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and nine counts of Violations of the Laws or Customs of War. See
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-02-54-T, supra note 3, paras. 32-45.
Regarding the Croatian conflict, Milosevic is charged with nine counts of Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, thirteen counts of Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, and ten counts of Crimes
Against Humanity. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, First Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-02-54-T, supra
note 3, paras. 34-83. Finally, with respect to the Kosovo war, Milosevic is accused of four counts of
Crimes Against Humanity and in a single count of Violations of the Laws or Customs of War. See
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Second Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, supra note 3, paras. 6268. See also Slobodan Milosevic: Reversal of Fortune,supra note 3.
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rivaled the press
generated by the man known to many as the "the butcher of
15
the Balkans.,
Plea bargaining has come to The Hague. Whatever its merits, the gravity
of the alleged crimes in the Milosevic case strongly suggest that the likelihood
Milosevic will avail himself of this new and highly contentious method of6
dispute resolution is slim at best. Though commonplace in the United States,'
the practice of resolving criminal matters through negotiated settlements
(often resulting in more lenient punishments) is foreign to the ICTY. Noted
for its "methodical if plodding trials,"' 17 the Hague Tribunal had received
comparatively few guilty pleas in the years after the Tribunal's inception in
1993. In fact, over the course of the Tribunal's first ten years, only eight cases
through May 2003 had been resolved through negotiated dispositions. 's
However, in response to increasing external pressure to expedite its
adjudication process from both the U.N. Security Council (which has insisted
that no new indictments issue after 2004 and that all trials conclude in 2008)
and the George W. Bush administration (which supplies approximately onequarter of the Tribunal's funding), the practice of plea bargaining has become
a staple of ICTY activity. 19 Since the middle of 2003, a "record number" of
ICTY cases have been resolved via plea bargains.2 °
Accompanying this development, however, has been vociferous
criticism from an array of groups and individuals. Victims' rights
organizations, for example, have complained of comparative leniency, noting
that since the institution of plea bargaining was introduced, many of the
defendants who negotiated their guilt-including highly culpable Balkan
leaders-have received more favorable sentences than their predecessors who
had gone to trial. 21 Even former ICTY Judge David Hunt, in an unusually
acerbic dissenting opinion issued just prior to his departure from the bench in
2003, complained bitterly that the external pressures upon the Tribunal to
expedite its work threaten to compromise defendant rights and, ultimately, the
integrity of the court:
If the Tribunal is not given sufficient time and money to [try individuals accused of
serious international war crimes] by the international community, then it should not
attempt to try those persons in a way which does not accord with those rights.... This
15. See Slobodan Milosevic: Reversal of Fortune,supra note 3.
16. See Carla Del Ponte, Four Years in The Hague: A Retrospective-and the Way Forward
9, at http://www.clingendael.nl/ngiz/lectures/delponte 2003.pdf (Oct. 2, 2003).
17. Marlise Simons, Plea Deals Being Used To Clear Balkan War Tribunal's Docket, N.Y.
TiMEs, Nov. 18, 2003, at Al.
18. See Del Ponte, supra note 16, at 9.
19. See id.; see also FasterJustice for the Balkans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2003, at A30;
Simons, supranote 17.
20. See Del Ponte, supra note 16, at 9; Simons, supra note 17 (indicating that an additional
eight defendants had entered guilty pleas between May and November 2003); Michael P. Scharf,
TradingJusticefor Efficiency, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1070, 1074 (2004) (stating that "between 2001 and
2003, the Tribunal approved 12 plea bargains, clearing 40 per cent of the cases from its crowded
docket"). Since the preparation of Professor Scharfs article, at least three additional defendants have
entered guilty pleas: Ranko Cesic, see infra note 76 (entering guilty plea to all twelve counts of an
Amended Indictment on October 8, 2003); Miroslav Deronjic, see infra note 90 (entering guilty plea to
Persecutions, a Crime against Humanity, on September 30, 2003); and Milan Babic, see infra notes 8690 (entering guilty plea to Persecutions, a Crime against Humanity, in January 2004).
21.
See Simons, supra note 17.
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Tribunal will not be judged by the number of convictions which it enters, or by the speed
with which it concludes the Completion Strategy which the Security Council has
endorsed, but by the fairness of its trials. The Majority Appeals Decision and others in
which the Completion Strategy has been given priority
22 over the rights of the accused will
leave a spreading stain on this Tribunal's reputation.

In addition, some object to plea bargaining as a matter of principle. They
contend that plea bargains simply should not extend to individuals accused of
the egregious atrocities that typify Hague prosecutions. 23 While sentencing
concessions may be an inextricable characteristic of the American plea
bargaining system, critics insist that such practices are inappropriate for war
crimes tribunals, such as the ICTY, which sentence individuals charged with
mass torture and homicide. 24 It is also submitted that plea bargaining impedes
the development of an accurate historical record. Naysayers in this camp
contend that the adoption of a plea bargaining strategy at The Hague would
inevitably deprive war victims of their primary platform from which to relate
firsthand the realities of the Balkan carnage.
Proponents, on the other hand, cite several reasons why the advent of
plea bargaining should be considered a welcome development. They argue
that the negotiated plea deals accurately reflect each accused's true criminal
responsibility; that the court's retention of sentencing discretion empowers the
Tribunal to reject any and all sentencing recommendations suggested by the
parties; and that the negotiated dispositions, which often contain cooperation
agreements, enable the prosecution to obtain, and thus submit before the
Tribunal, valuable testimonial evidence against more culpable Balkan war
criminals. 26 They further discount claims that plea bargaining somehow
compromises the creation of an accurate historical record. Given that many of
the guilty pleas pertain to conduct that was fully explored and developed in
earlier trials before the Tribunal, proponents insist that the historical record in
many instances has already been created, and that additional testimony would
merely be redundant.27 They claim that negotiated settlements bring a sense of
closure to the victims of war, reasoning that a defendant's admission of guilt
carries with it not only a public acknowledgement of wrongdoing but also
recognition of the horrific atrocities committed. 28 Finally, plea bargaining is
viewed as a mechanism through which financial costs and witness
inconvenience can be minimized, and the backlog of cases that have
traditionally burdened the Tribunal can be lessened.29
Despite the ongoing controversy, it is clear that plea bargaining has a
permanent presence at The Hague. Forced to confront pressures from both the
United Nations and the United States that threaten its continued existence, the
22. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of
Evidence in Chief, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, paras. 21-22 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Oct. 21, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decision-e/031021 diss.htm.
23. See Del Ponte, supra note 16, at 9.
24. See Foster, A Plea for Plea Bargains,MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 2003, at A10;
Combs, supra note 2, at 7.
25. See Del Ponte, supra note 16, at 9.
26. See id. at 10-11.
See id. at 10.
27.
28.
Seeid. at 11-12.
29. See id. at 10-11; see also Simons, supra note 17.
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ICTY has little choice but to adopt a plea bargaining strategy. Given this
reality and the consequential rapid rise in bargained-for dispositions, this
Article will not revisit arguments regarding the merits and demerits of plea
bargaining. Instead, it will focus its critique upon the efficacy of the
Tribunal's guilty plea hearing practices, explaining why the ICTY's rush to
adopt plea bargaining has, thus far, outpaced its readiness for the task. In so
doing, this Article will detail the factors that underlie the ICTY's failure, and
it will demonstrate why the Tribunal's adopted approaches do not
meaningfully measure whether the guilty pleas tendered are free of undue
coercive influences or are reflective of an informed choice. It will describe a
plea hearing process that varies considerably from courtroom to courtroom
due, in large part, to the illimitable discretion that the Tribunal rules afford
ICTY judges. It will further detail how these rules interact with the conceptual
and practical unfamiliarity of defendants and (in many instances) their
attorneys with both plea bargaining and ICTY trial procedures. These defects
not only produce guilty pleas that are of dubious validity but further threaten
to undermine the integrity of the Tribunal.
This Article will commence, however, with a detailed review of the
historical rise of plea bargaining at The Hague and will then conduct several
case studies. Through this examination, the Article will expose the wide array
of guilty plea acceptance procedures that have become a staple of judicial
practice at The Hague, and explain why these variant methodologies
inadequately gauge a defendant's knowledge and voluntariness. This review
will further illuminate how certain judicial questioning techniques have
contributed to this inadequacy by exploiting the vulnerable state of defendants
who appear before the court. The Article will then discuss how defendants and
many defense attorneys are further disadvantaged during the plea bargaining
and guilty plea hearing processes, given their unfamiliarity with adjudicative
and dispute resolution practices at The Hague. Finally, the Article will discuss
the potentially damaging precedential consequences that the ICTY's plea
practices will have for defendants who appear before the array of other
international criminal tribunals that have also adopted plea bargaining.
Thereafter, it will suggest some curative measures designed not only to bring
greater structure and fairness to the ICTY guilty plea process but also to help
ensure greater fairness of procedure in the years to come.
II.

THE NEW PLEA BARGAINING STATUTE-EVOLUTION AND ANALYSIS

An individual charged with a criminal offense before the Tribunal is
required to enter a plea of either guilty or not guilty within thirty days of his
initial appearance. Though the original version of the ICTY's Rules of
Practice and Procedure made no allowance for a guilty plea option, the
situation changed after the case of Prosecutorv. Erdemovic. In May 1996,
Drazen Erdemovic was charged in a two-count indictment with Crimes
Against Humanity and with Violation of the Laws or Customs of War for
atrocities committed against Bosnian Muslims at a collective farm near
30.

ICTY R. P. & EVID. 62(A)(iii).
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Pilica.3" As a member of the Bosnian-Serb army, Erdemovic was accused of
participating in the murder of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men who had been
transported to the farm by bus from Srebrenica. 32 All of the Bosnian victims
were shot as their backs were turned to Erdemovic and the other members of
the Bosnian-Serb army.3 3

At his initial appearance, Erdemovic entered a guilty plea to the first
count of the indictment, Crimes Against Humanity, 34 and was subsequently
sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment.35 On appeal, Erdemovic
sought to have his sentence lessened, arguing, in part, that the trial chamber
failed to consider adequately his claim that he had committed the homicides
under duress. 6 Noting that it "finds nothing in the Statute or the Rules...
which would confine its consideration of the appeal to the issues raised
formally by the parties," the Appeals Chamber decided, of its own volition,
also to consider the validity of Erdemovic's underlying guilty plea. 37 By a
four to one vote, the Chamber found that the guilty plea entered by Erdemovic
was not informed and ordered that Erdemovic be given the opportunity to
plead anew. 38
The reasons underlying the Appeals Chamber's decision were detailed in
the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Lal Chand
Vohrah.39 McDonald, a former ICTY president, is a U.S. citizen and was a
civil rights attorney in her home country prior to her appointment in 1979 to
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 40 Upon reading the
Separate Opinion, it can be surmised that Judge McDonald's experiences on
the federal bench greatly influenced her perceptions of the Erdemovic plea. As
a federal district court judge, McDonald was required to follow the dictates of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure whenever a defendant
appeared before her seeking to enter a guilty plea. Rule 11 delineates an
elaborate procedure for district courts to follow whenever they conduct a
guilty plea hearing. In its current form, Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part:
(b)

Considering and accepting a guilty or Nolo Contendere plea.

31.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Indictment, Case No. IT-96-22, paras. 9-16 (Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 29, 1996), http://www.un.org(ictylindictmenttenglisherdii960529e.htm.
32. Id. paras. 10, 12.
33. Id. para. 11.
34. Id. para. 16; Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Plea Transcript, Case No. 1T-96-22-PT, at 17, 2426 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 31, 1996), http://www.un.org/icty/transe22/96053 IID.htm.
35. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-T, para. 111 (Int'l
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 29, 1996), http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgement/erd-tsj961129e.htm.
36. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-A, paras.
9-11 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 7, 1997), http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-aj971007e.htm.
37. Id. para. 16.
38. Id., Disposition, paras. 3, 5.
39.
See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge
Vohrah, Case No. IT-96-22-A (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 7, 1997),
http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-asojmcd971007e.htm.
40. See Richard May, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald: A BiographicalNote, in ESSAYS ON ICTY
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE: IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 4-5 (Richard May et al. eds.,

2001) (indicating that Judge McDonald retired from the federal bench in 1988).
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(1)

Advising and questioning the defendant. Before the court accepts a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere . . . the court must address the defendant
personally in open court .. . [and] must inform the defendant of, and
determine that the defendant understands, the following:

(B)

the right to plead not guilty, or having already so pleaded, to
persist in that plea;

(C)

the right to ajury trial;

(D)

the right to be represented by counsel-and if necessary have the
court appoint counsel-at trial and at every other stage of the
proceeding;

(E)

the right at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
to be protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and
present evidence, and to compel the attendance of witnesses;

(F)

the defendant's waiver of these trial rights if the court accepts a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere;

(G)

the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading;

(H)

any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and
term of supervised release;

(2)

Ensuring that a plea is voluntary. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court
and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force,
threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement).

(3)

Determining the factual basis for a plea. Before entering judgment on a
guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the
1
plea.4

Though directly referenced only twice, 42 Rule 1 I's influence on the
Erdemovic Joint Separate Opinion is clear. After generally observing that a
valid plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and unequivocally, 43 the
court thereafter refined these general principles, giving definition and detail to
the terms that would permeate the court's analysis. For a plea to be voluntary,
for example, the court held that a defendant should have the mental capacity
to comprehend the consequences associated with his guilt admission, and his
plea must be free of undue "threats, inducements or promises." 44 A knowing
41. FED. R. CRiM. P. lI(b)(1), (2), (3).
42. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge
Vohrah, Case No. IT-96-22-A, supra note 39, at n.13.
43. Id. para. 8.
44. Id. paras. 8, 10 (citing for authority Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to
the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).
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plea involves several factors: the defendant's cognizance of the various trialrelated rights that are sacrificed; a comprehensive understanding of the nature
of the charges, including knowledge of the elements of the respective
offenses; an ability to distinguish between the charged offenses and "the
consequences of pleading guilty to one rather than the other"; and an
awareness of the associated penal consequences. 45 Each of these requirements
is either a delineated part of Rule 11 or, at the very least, analogous to a
provision therein.46
In support of its finding that Erdemovic's plea was uninformed, the
court was not persuaded that Erdemovic was aware of the various trial rights
that he would necessarily sacrifice: namely, his right to a trial, his right to be
presumed innocent, and his right to "assert his innocence and his lack of
criminal responsibility., 47 The court further found that the trial court record
did not indicate that Erdemovic comprehended the nature of the charges
against him. Concluding that Erdemovic had "no idea" what the legal
distinctions were between Crimes Against Humanity, to which he pled
guilty, 48 and Violation of the Laws or Customs of War, the count which had
been withdrawn, 49 the court surmised that Erdemovic was "probably even to
this day, ignorant of the true nature of each of the two charges against him,"
given the failure on the part of the court and defense counsel to explain the
distinctions.5 °
Though Erdemovic did "not propose an exhaustive and definitive
statement of the rights beyond what is strictly necessary for the disposal of
this case," 5 the Appeals Chamber's decision nevertheless had lasting
ramifications. Approximately one month after Erdemovic was decided, the
ICTY added Rule 62 bis to its criminal procedure code. 52 Enacted to guide the
Tribunal with respect to the entry of guilty pleas, the rule currently provides:
If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or requests to change his or
her plea to guilty and the Trial Chamber is satisfied that:
(i)

the guilty plea has been made voluntarily;

(ii)

the guilty plea is informed;

Id. para. 10 (internal citations omitted).
45.
Id. paras. 8, 14-27.
46.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(b)(1), (2).
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,
47.
Case No. IT-96-22-A, supra note 39, para. 15.
48.
Id. para. 18.
49.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22, supra note 35, para.
3.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,
50.
Case No. IT-96-22-A, supra note 39, paras. 17-18. Citing the colloquy between the presiding judge and
Erdemovic, the appellate court found that the record
...established no more than that the Appellant was advised by his counsel regarding the
Indictment before he entered his plea, that the Indictment was available to the Appellant
in a language he understood, and that the Appellant understood that the Indictment
charged him with two offences. There is no indication that the Appellant understood the
nature of the charges.
Id. para. 18.
Id. para. 7.
51.
52.
ICTY R. P. & Evm. 62 bis.
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(iii)

the guilty plea is not equivocal; and

(iv)

there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused's
participation in it, either on the basis of independent indicia or on lack of
any material disagreement between the parties about the facts of the case,

the Trial Chamber may53enter a finding of guilt and instruct the Registrar to set a date for
the sentencing hearing.

In contrast to Rule 11 and the detailed review in Erdemovic, Rule 62 bis
is remarkably bare-bones. Aside from its requirements that a defendant enter a
guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and unequivocally, and that a factual basis
exist to support the proffered plea, the rule did not adopt the more refined
requirements detailed in either Rule 11 or Erdemovic. As a result, it provides
no guidance whatsoever to the Trial Chamber as to how to make these
respective determinations. Interestingly, Rule 62 bis is reminiscent of Rule 11
in its infancy. From its birth in 1944 until its radical reformation in 1975, Rule
11 had similarly skeletal requirements. When the Supreme Court in 1968
decided Boykin v. Alabama,54 the statute simply provided:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo
contendere.The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea
or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and
determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court
refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty
unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.

At issue in Boykin was whether a defendant's guilty plea entered in
Alabama state court could be considered valid when the underlying record
failed to disclose any colloquy between the court and the defendant with
respect to the plea.56 After the Supreme Court held that a court could not
presume a valid waiver of several federal constitutional rights "from a silent
record," 57 and that some "affirmative showing that it was intelligent and
voluntary" was required, 58 Rule 11 was reconfigured in 1975 to provide the
federal courts with detailed guidelines to follow whenever a guilty plea is
proffered. The indefiniteness of the earlier versions of Rule 11 prompted
Congress to implement significant curative measures in an effort to avoid a
53.
Id. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 62 (vi) provides:
Upon transfer of an accused to the seat of the Tribunal, the President shall forthwith
assign the case to a Trial Chamber. The accused shall be brought before that Trial
Chamber or a Judge thereof without delay, and shall be formally charged. The Trial
Chamber or the Judge shall:
(vi)

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

in case of a plea of guilty:
if before the Trial Chamber, act in accordance with Rule 62 bis, or
if before a Judge, refer the plea to the Trial Chamber so that it may act in
accordance with Rule 62 bis.
395 U.S. 238 (1968).
FED.R. CRIM.P. 11 (1966).
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 239-44.
Id.at 243.
Id. at 242.
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repeat of the problems presented in Boykin and to better ensure the entry of
voluntary and knowing guilty pleas.
Rule 62 bis suffers from the same problems that plagued Rule 11 in
1968. Like the rudimentary version of Rule 11, Rule 62 bis is devoid of
meaningful directives to guide the Tribunal judges. The vagueness of
definition and the limitless discretion afforded Tribunal judges under the rule
have produced a hodgepodge judicial approach to Rule 62 bis that has
consistently failed to ascertain meaningfully whether the guilty pleas received
have been entered knowingly, voluntarily, and unequivocally with an
adequate factual basis.
The following case studies will illuminate this reality and reveal the
widely divergent practices that have come to characterize ICTY practice.
They will expose a process that is not only inconsistent and unpredictable but
also threatens to undercut the laudable purpose that presumably underlies the
enactment of Rule 62 bis-the protection of defendant rights during the guilty
plea process.
A.

Biljana Plavsic-theBosnian-Serb "Iron Lady" 59

Unquestionably, the most notorious individual who has entered a guilty
plea before the Tribunal to date has been Biljana Plavsic. Born in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1930, Plavsic was an academic who did not pursue a political
career until 1990, when she became a member of the Serbian Democratic
Party (SDS).60 She quickly ascended to a leadership position within the SDS
and soon began to wield significant influence within the Bosnian-Serb
leadership. 61 With Bosnia and Herzegovina on the cusp of declaring its
independence in the early 1990s, Plavsic played a prominent role in furthering
the leadership's objective of creating a greater Serbia. 62 During the SerbianBosnian hostilities, Plavsic, along with Bosnian-Serb leaders Radovan
Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik,63 vigorously pursued a policy of purging
Bosnian Muslims 64and Croats, among other non-Serb populations, from
Bosnian territories.
Though "[s]he did not participate with Milosevic, Karadzic, Krajisnik
and others in its conception and planning and had a lesser role in its

See Trial of Top Bosnian Serb Genocide Suspect Postponed, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
59.
May 8, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2798182.
Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1, para. 10 (Int'l
60.
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 27, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/plavsic/trialc/judgement/index.htm.
Id.
61.
62. Id. paras. 10-11.
63. Id. para. 14 (noting that Karadzic and Krajisnik were "the two pre-eminent and controlling
figures in the SDS and the Bosnian Serb government," and that "they exercised primary power and
[I]t was primarily they who met with and provided
control over the Bosnian Serb structures ....
direction to municipal and regional leaders who were responsible for carrying out the objective of ethnic
separation by force." (quoting Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Factual Basis for Plea of Guilty, Case No. IT-00-39
& 40/1, Sept. 30, 2002, para. 16).
64. Bilana Plavsic: Serbian Iron Lady, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/I 108604.stm (Feb. 27, 2003).
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execution," 65 Plavsic nevertheless supported and furthered the campaign
through her high position of leadership within the Bosnian-Serb hierarchy.
Whether through her public statements justifying the employment of force
against non-Serb populations, or her invitations to neighboring Serbia to aid
the Bosnian-Serbs' ethnic cleansing campaign, Plavsic's actions further
encouraged the ethnic cleansing activities that permeated the Serbian-Bosnian
conflict. 66 As a result of this design, thousands of non-Serbs died in
municipalities, in detention, and "while performing forced labour and being
used as human shields during combat operations. ' 67 Moreover, numerous
cultural and religious structures were destroyed, and non-Serb Bosnians were
deported and subjected to subhuman living conditions. 68 Approximately a year
after the cessation of hostilities that accompanied the 1995 signing of the
Dayton Peace Accords, 69 Plavsic took office as president of the Republika
Srpska, the Serbian portion of the newly partitioned Bosnian territory. She
served in this capacity until 1998.70
Originally indicted by The Hague Tribunal in April 2000 on an array of
charges arising out of the Serbian-Bosnian conflict, 7' Plavsic surprised many
when, at age 72, she entered a guilty plea to a single count of Persecutions, a
72
Crime Against Humanity, in October 2002. Aside from the notoriety that
necessarily accompanied the guilty plea of such a high-ranking official, a
review of her guilty plea hearing transcript reveals a colloquy that is
astonishingly devoid of meaningful judicial examination. Without reading,
summarizing, or otherwise informing the defendant of virtually any essential
aspect of the plea agreement, the Trial Chamber found that the Rule 62 bis
standards were satisfied based exclusively on the following limited exchange:
JUDGE MAY: The Rules of the Tribunal require that the Trial Chamber is satisfied that a
plea of guilty has been made voluntarily, that it is informed and not equivocal, and that
there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the participation of the accused in it.
Mrs. Plavsic, in the plea agreement which we have read, you have signed a declaration
that you entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily, understanding its terms, and
having been advised by your lawyers.' You have also signed a statement to the same
effect in which is added that the plea is informed and unequivocal. Do you confirm that
those declarations are correct?

65.

Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1, supra note 60,

para. 13.
66.
Id. para. 14.
Id. paras. 15-16.
67.
See id.
68.
69.
See Elizabeth M. Cousens, Making Peace in Bosnia Work, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 789,
796-97 (1997).
See Neil Tweedie, Witnesses Are Offered Protection, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 13, 2002,
70.

availableat 2002 WL 12303642.
71.
Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Indictment, Case No. IT-00-40-I (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Apr. 3, 2000), http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/pla-iiOO0407e.htm. An
Amended Consolidated Indictment was confirmed on March 7, 2002. Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Amended
Consolidated Indictment, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Mar. 7, 2002), http://www.un.orglicty/indictment/english/kra-cai02O3O7e.htm.
72. Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1, supra note 60,
para. 5. She was sentenced to eleven years of imprisonment. Id. para. 134; see also Trial of Top Bosnian
Serb Genocide Suspect Postponed,supra note 59.
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73

Just as the Boykin colloquy was devoid of any affirmative indication that
the defendant had entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily, the
Plavsic record is largely indistinguishable. "I do" constitute two of only ten
words uttered by the defendant during the entire guilty plea hearing-and the
only two that addressed any of the factors relevant to Rule 62 bis.74 As the
above-cited colloquy indicates, the court acknowledged that Plavsic's plea
agreement declared that she was fully informed and that the agreement was
entered into voluntarily and unequivocally. The question that followed,
however, was ambiguous. Whether the court was asking Plavsic to affirm that
the declarations were true at the time the plea agreement was signed or to
affirm that they were true at the time of the hearing is less than clear.
Irrespective of this ambiguity, what is clear is that the court attempted no
additional inquiry whatsoever of the defendant. Questions were not asked that
would either illuminate the singular question that was posed or address any
other relevant aspects of the defendant's mental and volitional state. For
example, no inquiry was made to ascertain whether the plea was unduly
influenced by threats, promises, or inducements; whether Plavsic was aware
of the elements required to prove a charge of Crimes Against Humanity;
whether she could discern the differences between the respective charges in
the indictment; whether she was aware of the maximum penalty attendant to
that charge to which she pled; whether she was aware of any of the multitude
of rights that she would forfeit by virtue of her decision to enter a guilty plea;
75
or whether she agreed with the purported factual basis in support of the plea.
The conspicuous parallels between the colloquies in Boykin and Plavsic
are the direct byproducts of the textual indefiniteness that characterized the
former Rule 11 and that currently exists in Rule 62 bis. Empowered with
boundless discretion, the Plavsic Chamber conducted a superficial
examination, devoid of meaningful inquiry or an attempt to inform the
defendant of the plea agreement's terms and consequences. The following
case, Prosecutorv. Cesic, serves as an additional indicator of the inadequate
judicial methodologies that have come to characterize Chamber practice.
Although arguably an improvement upon the Boykin-like practice that could
be discerned in the Plavsic colloquy, Cesic is notable for its omission of a
number of factors highly relevant to an adequate assessment of the standards
delineated in Rule 62 bis.

73.
Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Plea Transcript, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, at 338 (Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 2002), http://www.un.orglicty/transe3940/021002ED.htrn.
74. Id. At the commencement of the hearing, the court asked Plavsic, "[C]an you hear me?"
Plavsic replied, "Yes, I can hear you." Id. at 337. When asked how she wished to plead to the charge of
Crime Against Humanity, Plavsic responded, "I plead guilty." Id. at 338.
75.
By pleading guilty, a defendant necessarily sacrifices the right to a trial, ICTY R. P. &
EVID. 62(A)(v); the right to present witnesses on the defendant's behalf and to cross-examine those
called by the prosecution, ICTY R. P. & EVID. 85(A) & (B); the right to have the prosecution prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, ICTY R. P. & EVID. 87(A); and the right not to make any
statement that might be incriminating, ICTY R. P. & EvID. 90(E).
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B.

Ranko Cesic

As a member of the intervention platoon, a special police unit affiliated
with the Bosnian-Serb police force, Ranko Cesic shot and killed several
Muslim detainees, beat another to death, and forced at gunpoint two Muslim
brothers to perform sexual acts upon each other. 76 For this conduct, Cesic was
indicted on six counts of Crimes Against Humanity (five counts for Murder
and one for Sexual Assault) and six counts of Violations of the Laws or
77
Customs of War (five counts for Murder and one count for Sexual Assault).
He pled guilty to all twelve counts in October 2003 and was subsequently
sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment.78
After Cesic acknowledged during the Rule 62 bis hearing that he had
signed the plea agreement, 79 the court proceeded to summarize the
document's terms. The court informed the defendant of his agreement to plead
guilty to all twelve counts of the indictment and of the prosecution's promise
to submit a non-binding sentencing recommendation of thirteen to eighteen
years, prior to providing a lengthy description of the facts in support of the
plea.80 Thereafter, the court asked Cesic only two questions relevant to the
Rule 62 bis inquiry: first, whether the defendant understood that the court was
not bound by the prosecution's sentencing recommendation; 81 and second,
whether the defendant had entered into the plea agreement voluntarily, and not
on account of undue force or threats. 82 To both questions, Cesic responded
affirmatively. 83
No other questions relevant to Rule 62 bis were asked. Although the
record reflects judicial declarations with respect to the trial rights forfeited, the
84
supporting factual basis, and the absence of external agreements, not a single
question was posed to Cesic regarding any of these matters. Even worse, there
was neither any judicial mention nor any dialogue regarding the maximum
possible sentence, the elements of the respective charges, or the requirement
that a defendant's guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In the end, the
Cesic colloquy is completely devoid of evidence that Cesic agreed with the
factual basis, understood any of the rights sacrificed, acknowledged the
absence of external agreements, was aware of the maximum possible
sentence, or was familiar with the nature of the charges to which he was
Prosecutor v. Cesic, Plea Agreement, Case No. IT-95-10/1-PT, paras. 4-7 (Int'l Criminal
76.
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 8, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/cesic/ces-plea03108-e.htm;
id. annex A, paras. 3-19; Prosecutor v. Cesic, Plea Transcript, Case No. IT-95-10/1-PT, at 64-67 (Int'l
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 8, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/transel01/031008MH.htm.
77.
Prosecutor v. Cesic, Plea Agreement, Case No. IT-95-10/1-PT, supranote 76, para. 3.
78.
Prosecutor v. Cesic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-95-10/1-5, para. 1 I (Int'l
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 11, 2004), http://www.un.org/iety/cesic/trialc/judgement/index.htm.
Prosecutor v. Cesic, Plea Transcript, Case No. IT-95-10/1-PT, supra note 76, at 63.
79.
80. Id. at 64-67.
81.
Id. at70.
82. Id. at 71-72.
83.
Id. at 70-72. Between the respective questions, the court also stated on the record that by
pleading guilty, the defendant was waiving his right to a public trial, his right to be present at his trial,
his right to examine witnesses, and his right not to be compelled to testify against himself. Id. at 71.
84. Id. at 64-67, 70-72.
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pleading guilty. These inquiries, deemed so critical to the Rule 62 bis process
by the court in Erdemovic, were wholly ignored by the Chamber in Cesic.
A process characterized by such selective inclusions and exclusions is
difficult to harmonize with the spirit that supposedly underlies Rule 62 bis.
Admittedly, the Cesic court's approach to determining compliance with Rule
62 bis was preferable to that adopted by the court in Plavsic. Although each
court relied on brief confirmatory statements as the basis for finding that Rule
62 bis had been satisfied, the Cesic court, unlike the Chamber in Plavsic, at
least mentioned some of the terms of the plea agreement during its guilty plea
colloquy. Yet by failing to even mention several other critical factors, let
alone explore the defendant's acumen and perspective with respect to these
that was random, incomplete, and
matters, the court engaged in a process
85
neglectful of the Rule 62 bis safeguards.
85. Prosecutorv. Mrdja is another case that is characterized by such selective inclusions and
exclusions. As a member of the Bosnian-Serb Intervention Squad, Darko Mrdja directly participated in
the mass slaughter of non-Serb civilians from the Bosnian municipality of Prijedor. Prosecutor v. Mrdja,
Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-59, para. 10 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Prosecutor v. Mrdja,
Mar. 31, 2004), http:li'www.un.org/icty/mrdja/trialc/judgement/index.htm;
Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-02-59, paras. 1, 3, 14 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Aug. 4, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mrd-ai030804e.htm. In 1992,
during the Serbian-Bosnian conflict, non-Serb prisoners (primarily Muslims and Croatians) who had
been detained at various facilities within Prijedor were transported by bus to Koricanske Stijene.
Prosecutor v. Mrdja, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra, para. 10; Prosecutor v. Mrdja,
Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra, paras. 1, 6, 8-12. Mrdja, who assisted in the
transportation and was present during the ride, was among the officers who directed the prisoners to
depart from the bus before escorting them to the edge of a cliff and ordering them to lower their heads
and kneel. Prosecutor v. Mrdja, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra,para. 10; Prosecutor v.
Mrdja, Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra, paras. 9-10, 13. Thereafter, Mrdja and other
members of the Intervention Squad shot to death more than two hundred individuals. Prosecutor v.
Mrdja, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra, para. 4; Prosecutor v. Mrdja, Amended
Indictment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra, para. 14. Twelve of the prisoners survived the massacre.
Prosecutor v. Mrdja, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra, para. 10; Prosecutor v. Mrdja,
Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra, par. 16. In July 2003, Mrdja pled guilty to counts two
and three of the Amended Indictment, which charged him with Murder, a Violation of the Laws or
Customs of War, and with Inhumane Acts (Attempted Murder), a Crime Against Humanity. Prosecutor
v. Mrdja, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra, para. 4; Prosecutor v. Mrdja, Amended
Indictment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra, para. 17. He was sentenced in March 2004 to seventeen years
imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Mrdja, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra,para. 129.
After confirming during the guilty plea hearing that Mrdja had signed the agreement, the court
proceeded to summarize the document. The court informed Mrdja of the facts in support of the plea, that
the agreement provided that the defendant would enter guilty pleas to counts two and three of the
indictment, that a joint non-binding sentencing recommendation of fifteen to twenty years would be
submitted to the court, that there were no external agreements or promises, and that by entering a guilty
plea Mrdja was forgoing his right to defend himself, to call and examine witnesses, and to remain silent.
Prosecutor v. Mrdja, Plea Transcript, Case No. IT-02-59, at 81-86 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, July 24, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/transe59/030724ME.htm (stating to Mrdja
that he would "mention just a few" of the rights that he would be forfeiting pursuant to his guilty plea).
The long summary was incessant, with the court never pausing to inquire whether Mrdja agreed with the
court's most recent factual and consequential characterizations. Only at the end of this extended
narration did the court ask the defendant its only question with respect to his understanding of the
agreement. Id. at 86 (noting that the Chambers asked Mrdja the following during the plea hearing: "I
went through the plea agreement on the main lines. Is there anything that is not clear to you in respect of
this agreement? Is there anything you would like to say adding to this agreement between you and the
Office of the Prosecution?"). "Your Honour, everything is clear to me," is Mrdj a's sole statement upon
which the court ultimately based its assessment that the requirements of Rule 62 bis were satisfied. Id. at
86.
Though the plea colloquy makes clear that the plea agreement was judicially described, and that
the defendant provided a global affirmation of understanding, there was no judicial mention or inquiry
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As exemplified in Plavsic and Cesic, the indeterminacy of Rule 62 bis
has resulted in an inconsistent and unpredictable methodology that has
consistently failed to produce meaningful inquiry guided by the requirements
that underlie the rule. The questions posed have been selective, while those
omitted altogether have been significant. Despite these shortcomings,
however, the Tribunal has invariably found that the Rule 62 bis requirements
have been satisfied. The following case, Prosecutionv. Babic, is illustrative of
yet another interesting approach to assessing the Rule 62 bis safeguards.
Though Babic shares many of the infirmities that plagued the colloquies in
Plavsic and Cesic, the case is highlighted here because it exemplifies another
set of commonly observed problems that are altogether different from those
discussed previously.
C.

Milan Babic

During his service as president of the Serbian National Council,
president of the Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia, and president and prime
minister of Krajina, a Serbian autonomous region within Croatia, Milan Babic
actively participated in and furthered the efforts of the Serbian and BosnianSerb leadership to create a greater Serbia through the expulsion of Croatian
and other non-Serb populations from various Croatian territories.8 6 Through
speeches, policy meetings with high-ranking Serbian and Bosnian-Serb
officials, the provision of weapons to Serbs within Croatia, and the provision
of staffing and financial assistance to Serb military structures, Babic provided
meaningful assistance in support of this objective. 87 Although Babic
advocated methods different from those ultimately employed and was
unaware of the extent of the atrocities that were being committed, the ethnic
against him were,
cleansing activities that formed the basis of the indictment
88
nevertheless, a foreseeable consequence of his actions.
In January 2004, Babic entered a plea of guilty to the first count of the
indictment-Persecutions, a Crime Against Humanity. 89 In contrast to the plea
colloquies previously discussed, Babic's transcript reveals that the Chamber
mentioned on the record virtually all the factors relevant to a Rule 62 bis
inquiry. In essence, the court read the entire plea agreement into the record,
necessarily informing the defendant of the charge to which Babic had agreed
to plead guilty, the sentencing maximum, the prosecution's non-binding
whatsoever with respect to several other critical factors relevant to Rule 62 bis. For example, the record
is devoid of any mention of or dialogue regarding the existence of undue threats or inducements,
Mrdj a's knowledge of the distinctive elements of the respective offenses, his awareness of the court's
authority to impose a life sentence, or his understanding that by pleading guilty he necessarily sacrificed
his right to have the prosecution prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
86. Prosecutor v. Babic, Plea Agreement, Case No. IT-03-72-I, Tab 1, Factual Statement,
paras. 4-9, 11-34 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 22, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/babic/triale/plea fact.htm.

87.

Id. paras. 17, 33.

88.

Id. paras. 17, 34.

89. Id. para. 2. On June 29, 2004, Babic was sentenced to a term of thirteen years
imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Babic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-03-72-S, para. 102 (Int'l
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 29, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/babic/trialc/judgement/index.htm.
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sentencing recommendation, the factual basis in support of the plea, the
respective rights necessarily waived, and the agreement's declaration that the
plea was entered voluntarily and free of undue threats, inducements, and
external promises. 90 Upon the conclusion of this process, the Chamber
inquired whether Babic was aware of the consequences of his agreement to
plead guilty. Babic responded simply, "Your Honour, I am aware.
The Court deemed Babic's global affirmation sufficient indication that
the requirements of Rule 62 bis had been satisfied. Although he was never
asked to affirm his concurrence until the very end of the court's lengthy
recitation, some might forgive such judicial neglect in light of the apparent
Babic upon the conclusion of the process to voice any
opportunity afforded
92
reservations.
When assessing the adequacy of any guilty plea procedure, however, the
context in which the guilty pleas are tendered must always be remembered. It
is this context that influences, and too often infects, the legitimacy of any plea.
It is critical to keep in mind that every defendant who appears before the
Tribunal is afforded the right to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 93 Whether guilty in fact, or legally or factually innocent, each
defendant possesses this right. Whether a defendant ultimately elects to
exercise the right or to pursue a negotiated disposition, facts must be proven
with sufficient certainty to establish the defendant's guilt of the crime alleged.
It is not enough that the defendant is guilty of some crime. Instead, there must
be a sufficient nexus between the actions of the defendant and each element of
the crime he is alleged to have committed. Absent the establishment of this
nexus, the defendant is, at a minimum, legally innocent.
Indeed, the plight of the innocent defendant is central to the ongoing
debate in the United States over the propriety of plea bargaining. While
proponents of the practice contend that contractual freedom to engage in plea
bargaining grants the litigating parties greater latitude to achieve optimal

90. In addition, there was some discussion about the nature of the charge. Prosecutor v. Babic,
Plea Transcript, Case No. IT-03-72-I, at 29-45 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan.
27, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/transe72/040127IA.htm. A similar process was followed in
Prosecutor v. Deronjic. During the Serbian-Bosnian hostilities, Miroslav Deronjic, as president of the
Bratunac Crisis Staff, held a position of authority that he used to further the objective of the BosnianSerb leadership to create Serbian ethnic territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prosecutor v.
Deronjic, Factual Basis, Case No. IT-02-61-PT, paras. 2, 4, 8-47 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/deronjic/trialc/plea/facts-030923-e.htm. In pursuit
of this objective, Deronjic assisted in efforts to displace the sizeable Muslim community within the
Bratunac Municipality, including the town of Glogova, and to convert the area into a Serbian ethnic
territory. Id. para. 13. Raids authorized by Deronjic on the town of Glogova resulted in the destruction
of innumerable Muslim occupied residences, the murder of approximately sixty-five Bosnian-Muslim
residents, and the displacement of countless Bosnian-Muslims from their villages. Id. paras. 18-44. On
September 30, 2003, Deronjic entered a guilty plea to Persecutions, a Crime Against Humanity.
Prosecutor v. Deronjic, Plea Transcript, Case No. IT-03-72-I, at 82-83 (Trial Chamber, Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Sept. 30, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/transe6l/030930IT.htn.
Thereafter, in an approach somewhat similar to that adopted by the court in Babic, the Chambers had the
Registrar read the entire plea agreement into the record. Id. at 37.
91.
Prosecutor v. Babic, Plea Transcript, Case No. IT-03-72-I, supra note 90, at 44-45.
92. The transcription of the court's summarization of the plea agreement was fifteen pages
long. Id. at 29-45.
ICTY R. P. & EvID. 87(A).
93.
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resolutions, 94 and that plea bargaining increases efficiency, in an otherwise
overburdened criminal justice system, 95 critics insist that such arguments
96
improperly discount the impact of the practice upon the innocent defendant.
Confronted with a choice between the harsher sentence that typically
accompanies a conviction at trial, and the lesser sentence that can be
negotiated via a plea bargain, the innocent defendant will often pursue the
latter path.97 As stated by Professor Albert Alschuler, this selection is often
the direct byproduct not of rational thought and the free exercise of discretion,
but of prosecutorial tactics designed to extract a confession from defendants
under duress:
[A] plea negotiation system that merely vectored the risks of litigation would leave the
benefits and risks of litigation in balance from the defendant's perspective; it might
therefore yield a guilty-plea rate of about fifty percent. Guilty-plea rates in America are
substantially higher, and one reason is that prosecutors are not content merely to vector
the risks of litigation. For a variety of reasons including the pressure of their caseloads,
they usually would rather not try their cases. Accordingly, they tailor their offers not to
balance but to overbalance a defendant's chances of acquittal. As Professor Welsh S.
White reported:
.. . New York prosecutors often reduce their sentence recommendations by at
least fifty percent if they believe there is a fifty percent chance of a hung jury, and
by a great deal more if they believe that there is a fifty percent chance of acquittal.
If the chances of acquittal are greater, the practice in both offices [Philadelphia
and New York] is to offer at least proportionally higher concessions.
This process seems well-designed to produce the conviction of innocent defendants.

98

The pervasiveness of such prosecutorial strategies in the United States
and at The Hague, as well as their impact upon individual defendants, can be
debated ad infinitum. Office policies and individual tendencies are largely
non-quantifiable factors that would necessarily underlie any purported
measurement of the frequency and impact of such practices. Whatever the true
gauge, however, it can scarcely be denied that duress has a virulent presence
94. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1918-35 (1992).
95. See Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834, 836-37 (4th Cir. 1982):
Without plea bargains the state and federal criminal courts would collapse under the
burden of cases waiting the time consuming jury selection and trial. The Supreme Court
approved plea bargaining in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)... and found
it to be "an essential component" of the criminal process and that it should be encouraged
when properly administered.
96.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea BargainingSystem, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931, 934 (1983).
97. See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist'sGuide to
Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 2011, 2069-70 (2000):
[O]ther scholars have applied contract theory itself in arguing for the abolition of "any
bargained-for allocation of criminal punishment." For example, Albert Alschuler cited
familiar contracts and economics concepts of duress and externalities in arguing that
"pretty pictures of well-informed parties striking a rational balance of litigation risks miss
an important part of what invariably happens when a system of plea bargaining moves
from abstraction to reality." Rather, as noted by Donald Gifford, "[d]efendants are
coerced into pleading guilty because they face the risk of far more severe penalties if
tried and convicted than if sentenced after a guilty plea."
98. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea BargainingDebate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652, 71415 (1981) (citations omitted).
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at The Hague. Unlike the standard U.S. criminal trial, each defendant who
appears before the Hague Tribunal must ultimately make a harrowing
choice-a choice between exercising his right to trial, which can result in a
possible life sentence, 99 or pursuing an out-of-court disposition, which can
virtually guarantee one's eventual freedom. As evidenced by the sentences
imposed in Erdemovic, Cesic, and Babic, among several other negotiated
a guilty
cases at The Hague, the substantial rewards that typically10accompany
0
plea can be quite alluring, even to the innocent defendant.
99. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case Information Sheet, Case No. IT-97-24 (Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 23, 2004), http://www.un.orglicty/glance/stakic.htm
(indicating that Stakic was sentenced to life imprisonment). Several other ICTY cases have resulted in
dispositions that are virtually life sentences. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case Information Sheet, Case No. IT98-29-1 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 23, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/glance/galic.htm (indicating that Galic was sixty years of age when convicted; he was sentenced to
twenty years of imprisonment); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case Information Sheet, Case No. IT-95-10 (Int'l
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 23, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/glance/jelisic.htm
(indicating that Jelisic was thirty-one years of age when convicted; he was sentenced to forty years of
imprisonment); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case Information Sheet, Case No. IT-98-33 (Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 23, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/glance/krstic.htm
(indicating that Krstic was fifty-three years of age when convicted; after appeal, he was sentenced to
thirty-five years of imprisonment); Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case Information Sheet, Case No. IT-98-34
(Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 22, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/glance/naletilic.htm (indicating that Naletilic was fifty-six years of age when convicted; he was
sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment). In addition, as of October 2003, life sentences had been
imposed on at least five individuals at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). See Del
Ponte, supra note 16, at 4.
100. Though Plavsic was seventy-two at the time she pled guilty and was sentenced to an
eleven-year term, see Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case Information Sheet, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1 (Int'l.
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 22, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/glance/plavsic.htm, Erdemovic, Cesic, and Babic were considerably younger-twenty-five, thirty-nine, and
forty-seven, respectively-and they negotiated dispositions that will likely result in their release during
their middle-age and upper middle-age years. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case Information Sheet,
Case No. IT-96-22 (Int'l. Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 23, 2004),
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/erdemovic.htm (imposing a ten-year sentence); Prosecutor v. Cesic,
Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-95-10/1-5, supra note 78, paras. 4, 6, 111. (imposing an eighteenyear sentence); Prosecutor v. Babic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-03-72-S, supra note 89, paras. 1,
6-11, 102 (imposing a thirteen-year sentence). In addition, comparable resolutions virtually assuring
release during the defendant's middle-age and upper middle-age years have been extended to several
other defendants who have negotiated their guilt since the institution of the practice. See Prosecutor v.
Mrdja, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-59, supra note 85, paras. 5, 19, 129 (indicating that Mrdja
was thirty-six years old when he entered his guilty plea and was sentenced to seventeen years of
imprisonment); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case Information Sheet, Case No. IT-95-8 (Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 23, 2004), www.un.org/icty/glance/sikirica.htm (indicating (1)
that Sikirica was thirty-seven years of age when he pled guilty and was sentenced to fifteen years of
imprisonment; (2) that Dosen was thirty-four years of age when he pled guilty and was sentenced to five
years of imprisonment; and (3) that Kolundzija was forty-one years of age when he pled guilty and was
sentenced to three years of imprisonment); Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case Information Sheet, Case No.
IT-95-9/1 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 23, 2004), www.un.org/icty/glance/todorovic.htm (indicating that Todorovic was forty-two when he entered his guilty plea and was
sentenced to ten years of imprisonment); Prosecutor v. Deronjic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-0261-S, paras. 5, 18-19, 228 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 30, 2004),
http://www.un.org/icty/deronjic/trialc/judgement/index.htm (indicating that Deronjic was forty-nine
years of age when he pled guilty and was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment); Prosecutor v.
Obrenovic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-60/12-S, paras. 1, 12, 156 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/obrenovic/trialc/judgement/index.htm
(indicating that Obrenovic was forty when he entered his guilty plea and was sentenced to seventeen
years of imprisonment); Prosecutor v. Banovic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, paras. 1,
9, 96 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 28, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/banovic65-l/trialc/judgement/ban-sj031028e.htm (indicating that Banovic was thirty-three years of age
when he entered his guilty plea and was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment); Prosecutor v.
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Defendants in such a quandary who elect to pursue a negotiation strategy
understand that its ultimate success depends on two variables: first, they must
facilitate an agreement with the prosecution; and second, they must persuade
the court to impose a sentence within the desired sentencing range. It is
therefore imperative that when a defendant appears before the court, he
displays those personal qualities that will help alleviate any lingering judicial
concerns. One way such qualities can be demonstrated is through a
defendant's personal statement to the court during his change of plea or at
sentencing. Through such a statement, a defendant has the opportunity to
appear contrite and to express his deep regret for his criminal conduct.
Consider the following statement by Babic at the conclusion of his Rule 62 bis
hearing:
I come before this Tribunal with a deep sense of shame and remorse. I have allowed
myself to take part in the worst kind of persecution of people simply because they were
Croats and not Serbs. Innocent people were persecuted; innocent people were evicted
forcibly from their houses; and innocent people were killed ....
The regret that I feel is the pain that I have to live for the rest of my life. These crimes
and my participation therein can never be justified. I'm speechless when I have to express
the depth of my remorse for what I have done and for the effect that my sins have had on
the others. I can only hope that by expressing the truth, by admitting to my guilt, and
expressing the remorse can serve as an example to those who still mistakenly believe that
such inhumane acts can ever be justified ....
I hope that the remorse that I expressed will make it easier for the others to bear their pain
and suffering. I have come to understand that enmity and division can never make it
easier for us to live. I have come to understand that our-the fact that we all belong to the
same human race is more important than any differences, and I have come to understand
that only through friendship and confidence we can live together in peace and friendship,
and thus make it possible for our children to live in a better world ....
And lastly, I place myself at the full disposal of this Tribunal and international justice.
10t
Thank you very much.

Whether such expressions are truly heartfelt will forever be a matter for
speculation. Yet regardless of the defendant's state of repentance, it is an
indisputable fact that a primary objective of such personal statements is to
persuade the court to impose a favorable sentence. Indeed, throughout the
entire guilty plea and sentencing processes, the defendants who appear before
the Tribunal are generally cognizant of the Chamber's authority to disregard
any sentencing recommendations and to impose a life sentence. Thus, a
defendant in such delicate circumstances will deftly refrain from exhibiting
any conduct that could possibly be construed adversely. At all times, he will
proceed cautiously, careful to approach the court with reverence, to exhibit
remorse, and to display a deferential, respectful, and compliant demeanor.
Sikirica, Dosen, and Kolundzija, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, paras. 224, 235, 239 (Int'l
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 13, 2001), http://www.un.org/icty/sikirica/judgement/index_2.htm; cf.Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, paras.
1, 12, 183 (Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 2, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/mnikolic/trialc/judgement/index.htm (indicating that Nikolic was forty-eight years of age when he
entered his guilty plea and was sentenced to twenty-seven years of imprisonment).
101. Prosecutor v. Babic, Plea Transcript, Case No. IT-03-72-I, supra note 90, at 57-58.
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This observation explains why the approach adopted by the Chamber in
Babic is so seriously flawed. By essentially reading the plea agreement into
the record and making a single inquiry into the defendant's understanding of
the agreement in its entirety, the court took full advantage of Babic's hopeful
state. With a defendant fully inclined to appear cooperative and deferential,
and fully disinclined to appear inquisitorial or confrontational, the court's
cursory examination of Babic hardly suffices as a legitimate barometer of the
defendant's acumen regarding the plea decision. Like the Chamber in Plavsic
and Cesic, the Babic court made virtually no attempt to delve deeper to
ascertain the depth of the defendant's understanding. With so much at stake,
the inconsistent and cursory approaches routinely employed by the respective
Chambers are simply an inadequate means for ascertaining compliance with
the standards delineated in Rule 62 bis.
The inadequacies of such Chamber practices become even more
pronounced when the questioning techniques used in Rule 62 bis proceedings
are considered. In contrast to the plethora of detailed evidentiary rules that
regulate the trial interrogation of witnesses in the U.S. federal courts, 10 2 the
Chambers are afforded a more general regulatory authority. For example,
hearsay is generally admissible, 10 3 and there is no specific proscription against
the employment of either leading or compound questions. Instead, ICTY
procedural rules require only that relevant evidence is admitted
and that the
14
Chambers ensure that the trial process proceeds efficiently. 0
Leading questions, traditionally defined as questions that suggest the
desired response, 105 and compound questions, which pose more than one
query, 106 are either circumscribed or prohibited outright in U.S. federal
courts. ° 7 Whether leading questions are permitted is often contingent upon
the degree of empathy between the witness and the examiner. 18 The greater
102. FED. R. EvID. 607-15, 701-06, 801-07.
103. See Combs, supra note 2, at 77.
104. See supranote 102; ICTY R. P. & EviD. 89,90(f).
105. See United States v. Durham, 319 F.2d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1963) (indicating that "a leading
question is whether it so suggests to the witness the specific tenor of the reply desired by counsel that
such a reply is likely to be given irrespective of an actual memory").
106.

See 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 611.16 (5th ed. 2001).

107. U.S. federal courts generally permit leading questions on cross-examination and restrict
such questions on direct examination. FED. R. EVID. 611 (c); 2 GRAHAM, supra note 106, §§ 611.15-22
(indicating that compound questions are an objectionable question form).
108. Rule 611 (c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as
may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should
be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party,
or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions.
FED. R. EVID. 611 (c). The advisory cornments to Rule 611 (c) provide:
The rule continues the traditional view that the suggestive powers of the leading question
are as a general proposition undesirable. Within this tradition, however, numerous
exceptions have achieved recognition: The witness who is hostile, unwilling, or biased;
the child witness or the adult with communication problems; the witness whose
recollection is exhausted; and undisputed preliminary matters.
FED. R. EVID. 611 (c) cmt.; see also 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 820 (2004):
Whether leading questions should be permitted in cross-examination where it appears
that the witness is friendly to the cross-examiner's cause has usually been held within the
discretion of the trial court. Beyond this, however, or perhaps because of this principle of
discretion, the results in the cases have been diverse. On the one hand, it has been pointed
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the empathy, the more likely it is the question will be prohibited. During
direct examinations, it is often thought that the witness, who shares the same
litigative interests as the examiner, is strongly disinclined to contest the
suggestions proffered by the examiner. In such circumstances, it is deemed
preferable to prohibit the leading question and receive the witness's testimony
free of the examiner's influences.1°9 Conversely, on cross-examination, when
greater antipathy is characteristically present, leading questions are less likely
to be deemed objectionable. 110 In such situations, the witness has greater
incentives to contest the leads proffered by the examiner, thus defusing the
dangers otherwise associated with leading queries. Finally, compound
questions are prohibited irrespective of any empathy issues given the inherent
confusion that necessarily accompanies questions that require multiple
responses."'
Although the above-described rules are largely restricted to the trial
context,' 12 the principles that underlie them are informative in the guilty plea
arena as well. In the guilty plea setting, the Chamber-defendant relationship is
analogous to that between the direct examiner and the witness. In each
instance, the witness has a strong inclination to follow the leads of the
questioner, given that each views his examiner as a means to an end. The
direct-examination witness who desires a criminal conviction will view the
prosecuting attorney as a conduit through which a conviction can be obtained.
Similarly, the defendant during a guilty plea hearing views the judge as a
conduit through which a lesser sentence can be imposed. Neither witness is
inclined to disrupt the progression of events so long as the witness believes
the overriding objective is being achieved.
When the Chamber in Babic virtually read the entire plea agreement and
then asked the defendant whether he comprehended its terms, the court
essentially asked a leading and compound question that was more egregious

out that the reason for the rule permitting leading questions to an adverse witness on
cross-examination is the assumed hostility of such witness to the cross-examiner's cause.
Hence, it has been held that where an adverse witness is shown to be friendly toward or
biased in favor of the cross-examiner the reason for the rule ceases to exist and leading
questions may not be used in examining such witness.
109. See Julian A. Cook, III, Federal Guilty Pleas Under Rule 11: The Unfulfilled Promise of
the Post-Boykin Era, 77 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 597, 616-17 (2002):
Indeed, the restrictive and permissive distinctions identified in Rule 611 are not the
byproduct of arbitrary classifications, but stem from sound rationales. With respect to
direct examination, concerns about witness susceptibility underlie the general prohibition.
The empathy typically existent between the direct examiner and witness necessarily
subjects the witness to the leads of the examiner. Their shared litigative interests heighten
the risk that a witness, rather than testify of his own accord, will simply defer to the
leading or suggestive questions posed by the examiner.
110. See id. at 617 ("The litigative discord that characterizes most cross-examining
relationships renders it unlikely that a witness will be susceptible to the leads of the examiner. Unlike
direct examination, the witness during cross-examination regards the examiner as an adversary-as an
individual who seeks to impede his litigative interests.").
111. See 2 GRAHAM, supranote 106, § 611.16.
112. See FED. R. EvID. 1101(b) ('These rules apply generally to civil actions and proceedings,
including admiralty and maritime cases, to criminal cases and proceedings, to contempt proceedings
except those in which the court may act summarily, and to proceedings and cases under title 11, United
States Code.").
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than anything imaginable in a U.S. trial court setting. Consider the following
excerpt:
JUDGE ORIE: Finally, the plea agreement says that you voluntarily entered into this
agreement, and therefore if you would plead guilty, that it would be a voluntary plea; that
no threats were made to you to induce you to enter this guilty plea; and that no other
promises have been given to you apart from the ones mentioned in the plea agreement.
You have signed this plea agreement. May I ask you further whether you fully
understood what your commitments are? It has been confirmed already by your signature
and by Defence counsel, but the Chamber would like to hear from yourself as well
113
whether you are fully aware of what you signed to and what the consequences may be.

This passage constitutes a mere fraction of a virtually uninterrupted
judicial description of a plea agreement that easily exceeds ten transcribed
pages. 114 That single paragraph addressed the critical issue of voluntariness, as
well as related sub-issues pertaining to threats and promises external to the
agreement. Aside from the acquiescent atmosphere that generally
characterizes plea agreement colloquies, the sentence italicized above further
highlights the leading nature of the question posed by the Chamber. The judge
plainly informs Babic, just prior to obtaining his response, that the defendant's
affirmative understanding regarding the entirety of the plea agreement has
been previously confirmed by his counsel as well as by his signature on the
document. Thus, immediately preceding the court's single question, the court
suggests the desired response when it informs Babic that two separate sources
indicate that the defendant entered into the agreement knowingly, voluntarily,
and unequivocally and that a supporting factual basis exists.
Unfortunately, the employment of such inquisitorial tactics has been a
staple of guilty plea hearing'practice at the ICTY. Leading and compound
Chamber questions, followed by decorative monosyllabic responses, pass as
meaningful inquiry pursuant to Rule 62 bis. 115 Nevertheless, supporters might
dismiss such perceived inadequacies, arguing that any such deficiencies are
appreciably mitigated, if not cured altogether, by the presence of counsel.
They might claim that it would be reasonable to presume that defendants who
benefited from the assistance of counsel throughout the litigative process
should be presumed to have been informed of the various ramifications
associated with pleading guilty. The following Section addresses this
contention and explains why such a presumption is not warranted.

113. Prosecutor v. Babic, Plea Transcript, Case No. IT-03-72-I, supra note 101, at 44-45
(emphasis added).
114. Id. at29-30,32-45.
115. Consider the following exchange during the Cesic plea hearing. Afler the court essentially
read the entire plea agreement into the record, the Chambers posed the following leading and compound
question with respect to the defendant's voluntariness:
JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As far as the entering into this agreement from your own free will.
Mr. Cesic, you could confirm that this is how you came to this plea agreement?
Voluntarily, not being forced or threatened or in whatever way?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
Prosecutor v. Cesic, Plea Transcript, Case No. IT-95-10/1-PT, supra note 76, at 71-72.
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III.

PRESENCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL

Whether to enforce one's trial right or to pursue a negotiated disposition
is arguably the most important decision a defendant must make during the
criminal litigation process. When making this critical choice, it is essential
that the defendant be fully cognizant of the consequences associated with each
alternative. Like a marketplace buyer who risks a sub-optimal return if he
makes an investment decision based on incomplete information, the defendant
similarly assumes substantial risk whenever the election between trial and a
plea disposition rests, in part, on ignorance of the true value of each strategic
option. Thus, an optimal selection in this context is wholly dependent upon a
defendant's sufficient appreciation of the value of each commodity. For
example, when weighing the merits of an out-of-court strategy, the defendant
must be sufficiently familiar with the various trial-related rights, the
maximum penalty, the likelihood of the court's imposing a favorable sentence,
the elements of the charged offenses, and the facts that supposedly support
those charges. In addition, the defendant must assure himself that the election
of this option is voluntary-free of undue threats or inducements.
In the United States, a defendant is rarely deemed better positioned to
make such assessments without the assistance of counsel. Although the issue
of competency to waive one's right to counsel and, subsequently, one's right
to trial stands separate from the question of the wisdom of pursuing such
paths, the Supreme Court in Iowa v. Tovar recently reiterated the normative
principle that defendants contemplating such conjunctive steps should be
116
advised of the substantive benefits associated with the retention of counsel.
In discussing the courts' role in this context, the Supreme Court noted that
defendants "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation"' 17and that the "pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel.
. must be 'rigorous[ly] conveyed." ' 118 Referencing an array of complex trial
procedures and evidentiary rules, the Court observed that in a trial setting,
"even the most gifted layman" could benefit from the specialized skills and
acumen of trained legal counsel." 19
Given such complexity of process, it is certainly reasonable to presume
that counsel trained in criminal law are better equipped to gauge the merits
and demerits of the various disposition alternatives confronting a defendant.
This observation is especially valid in the international criminal arena, where
the litigation of highly complex international criminal norms is standard fare.
Comprehending and distinguishing among the norms commonly tried before
the Hague Tribunal--Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Violations
of the Law or Customs of War, Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanityand understanding the Tribunal's evolving mixture of inquisitorial and
adversarial adjudicative processes are but some of the skills necessary to
effectively gauge any strategic decision.
116. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004).
117. Id. at 89 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
118. Id. (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988)).
119. Id.(quoting Patterson,487 U.S. at 299 n.13).
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Admittedly, the presence of skilled counsel in this context could
ameliorate many of the procedural ills that currently plague the Tribunal's
plea hearing process. After all, an attorney learned in international criminal
law would presumably be well equipped to render the kind of sound
informational and tactical advice that could assuage the above-identified
procedural deficiencies. The Hague reflects a different reality, however; in
this court, the affirmative impact of counsel's presence is limited at best, and
is certainly not worthy of a curative presumption that defenders of the process
might advance.
While the ICTY allows every defendant who appears before the
Tribunal to be represented by counsel,12 0 the benchmark qualifications to
practice before the court have never been particularly stringent. Until August
2004, for example, an attorney was authorized to practice before the Tribunal
provided only that he was admitted to practice and had "reasonable experience
in criminal and/or international law." 121 Moreover, the comparatively
generous compensation received by many appointed counsel fails to mitigate
this problem. If a defendant is unable to afford an attorney-and most
defendants at The Hague claim indigence-the ICTY will provide one without
cost. 122 Most defense attorneys come from the Balkan states and are
compensated at rates that typically exceed what they receive from their home
120. See Directive No. 1/94 on Assignment of Defence Counsel, Aug. 4, 2004, art. 5, at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/counsel/IT073-revI0-e.htm [hereinafter Directive on Assignment of
Defence Counsel]:
Without prejudice to the right of an accused to conduct his own defense: i. a suspect who
is to be questioned by the Prosecutor during an investigation; ii. an accused upon whom
personal service of the indictment has been effected; and iii. any person detained on the
authority of the Tribunal, including any person detained in accordance with Rule 90 bis;
shall have the right to be assisted by counsel.
See also infra note 159 and accompanying text.
121. Until August 2004, Article 14(A) of Directive No. 1/94 on Assignment of Defence
Counsel provided:
Any person may be assigned as counsel to an accused if the Registrar is satisfied that he
is admitted to the list of counsel envisaged in Rule 45 (B) of the Rules. A person is
eligible for admission to the list if:
i.
he is admitted to the practice of law in a State, or is a university professor
of law;
ii.
he has not been found guilty in relevant disciplinary proceedings against
him where he is admitted to the practice of law or a university professor,
and has not been found guilty in relevant criminal proceedings against
him;
iii.
he speaks one of the two working languages of the Tribunal, except if the
interests ofjustice do not require this;
iv.
he possesses reasonable experience in criminal and/or international law;
v.
he agrees to be assigned as counsel by the Tribunal to represent any
indigent suspect or accused;
vi.
he is or is about to become a member of an association of counsel
practising at the Tribunal.
Directive No. 1/94 on Assignment of Defence Counsel, July 28, 1994, art. 14, at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/counseVIT073-rev9-e.htm. Article 14 was thereafter amended and now requires, inter alia,
that an attorney have "at least seven years of relevant experience, whether as a judge, prosecutor,
attorney or in some other capacity, in criminal proceedings." Directive on Assignment of Defence
Counsel, supra note 120, art. 14.
122. Id. art. 6(A) ("Suspects or accused who lack the means to remunerate counsel shall be
entitled to assignment of counsel paid for by the Tribunal."); see also Patricia Wald, The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day to Day
Dilemmas of an InternationalCourt, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 87, 103 (2001).
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country. 123 Thus, in contrast to the practices that unfortunately characterize
indigent representation in the United States, 124 appointed attorneys at The
Hague are all too willing to spend countless hours with their clients. 12 At first
blush, this fact might seem to suggest that the representation quality problems
that plague indigent defense in the United States might be less prevalent at the
ICTY. Further examination, however, reveals that this is not the case.
The defense attorneys and their clients who arrive at The Hague confront
adjudicative procedures very different from those with which they are
familiar. In contrast to the plea negotiation practices that now prevail at The
Hague, government bargaining over an individual's guilt has never been a part
of the criminal justice culture of the former Yugoslavia. 26 Moreover, the trial
processes adopted in the former Yugoslavia vary considerably from those
followed at the Tribunal. Unlike the ICTY, which mirrors in many respects
the U.S. adversarial model, 127 the former Yugoslavia adopted a more
inquisitorial system. 128 Predominant throughout continental Europe, 129 the
inquisitorial approach can be broadly characterized as a process that features a
greater judicial role than that customarily associated with the more attorneydominated adversarial system.' 30 In the inquisitorial structure, the judge, as
opposed to the attorneys, is the principal witness examiner, with the
prosecuting and defense attorneys assigned a much more circumscribed
role. 131 The evidentiary rules also tend to be more permissive. 132 The
this
defendant, though possessed of the right not to testify, rarely exercises
33
right given the adverse inference that the court is entitled to draw.'
Yugoslavia generally followed this model in its 1985 Code of Criminal
Procedure. 134 After the charging instrument was read, the presiding judge
would proceed to interrogate the defendant. 135 When the presiding judge had
completed his questioning, the other members of the judicial panel would then
pose additional questions. 136 Thereafter, the prosecution and defense attorneys
123. Wald, supra note 122, at 103-04.
124. See Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and the
Railroadingof CriminalDefendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 863, 908-10 (2004).
125. See Anthony D'Amato, Defending a Person Charged with Genocide, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L.
459,465 (2000).
126. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 288 (2001) (noting that during the sentencing phase, the ICTY
considers a defendant's cooperation with the prosecution as a mitigating factor, and that this practice "is
quite different from the judicial practice in the former Yugoslavia, which neither allowed pleabargaining nor rewarded cooperation with the prosecution").
127. See Combs, supra note 2, at 6-7.
128. See infra notes 134-141 and accompanying text.
129. See Combs, supra note 2, at 7.
130. See id. at 31-31.
131. See id. at 30-32.
132. See id. at 33-34:
Continental evidentiary rules are extremely relaxed and simple by American standards.
Because Continental criminal cases are heard either by professional judges or by a mixed
panel in which the professional judges guide their lay colleagues, the complex
evidentiary rules so prevalent in American proceedings are less frequently used.
Consequently, Continental trials admit most hearsay.
133. See id. at 35-36.
134. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (Yugoslavia), arts. 315.1, 2 (1985).
135. Id. art. 316.1.
136. The defendant could elect not to testify. Id. arts. 316.5, 317.2.
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would examine the defendant, but only if the court granted permission to do
so. 137 If there were additional defendants, the same process would be repeated.
When the questioning of all the defendants had been completed, the court
would receive other evidence. 138 The receipt of additional testimonial
evidence would follow the same progression outlined above, with judicial
approval required prior to any questions by the litigating parties. 139 After all
the evidence had been received, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the
a closing statement.140
defendant were entitled to address the court and present
141
The panel would then deliberate and render a verdict.
Yugoslavia's code of criminal procedure was later adopted by the
succeeding states in the years after the federation's disintegration. 4 2 Despite
some recent changes, the trial procedure described above remains largely
intact in the Balkan region. 14 3 Given this fact, the criminal justice procedures
common to the Yugoslavian states since the Josip Tito era deviate noticeably
from the measures currently employed at The Hague. As a result, many
defense attorneys come to the Tribunal under-equipped to represent their
clients effectively given their unfamiliarity with the processes of the court.
Confronted with a largely foreign trial and dispute-resolution system, many
attorneys proceed to litigate cases involving serious violations of international
law with neither the knowledge nor the skills necessary to perform their
assigned tasks adequately.
Indeed, various commentators have expressed such sentiments. Anthony
D'Amato, professor at the Northwestern University School of Law and a
former defense attorney at The Hague, made the following observations:
The Yugoslav lawyers did not seem well prepared for trial; they did not initiate motions
on behalf of their clients (with the exception of many complaints about conditions in
detention centers); and their briefs did not reflect (in my opinion) much comprehension
about the relevant substantive rules of international humanitarian law. So far, the
decisional record at the ICTY indicates that nearly all accused persons who have
achieved any success (either in acquittals, or getting charges dropped, or obtaining lighter
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. art. 318.1.
Id. arts. 322.1,2.
Id. art. 327.1.
Id. art. 339. Article 342 elaborated upon the closing argument phase:
(1)
In his speech, the defense counsel or the accused shall present the
arguments of the defense and comment on the statements made by the
prosecutor and the injured person.
(2)
Following his counsel, the accused is entitled to argue and declare whether
he approves of the arguments advanced by his counsel and supplement his
presentation.
(3)
The prosecutor and the injured person shall have the right to respond to
the defense, and the defense counsel and the accused the right to rejoin.
(4)
The accused shall always have the last word.

Id. art. 342.
141. Id. arts. 344,345, 347,350.
142. See Telephone Interview with Dragomir Modrusan, Attorney at Law, Modrusan Law
Office (Aug. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Interview with Dragomir Modrusan]. Modrusan is an attorney who
has practiced law in Croatia for over thirty years and who has litigated criminal cases as part of a
broader legal practice.
143. See Marilyn Justman Kaman, To Live and Work in Kosovo, 18 WTR CRIM. JUST. 5, 8
(2004) (discussing the trial process in Kosovo). But cf Interview with Dragomir Modrusan, supra note
142 (indicating that in the late 1990s, Croatia adopted a criminal trial process that is increasingly
adversarial in approach).
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sentences) have been represented by attorneys from the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Canada, and the United States.1"

Moreover, other observers have noted that "very few" defense attorneys
from the more inquisitorial judicial systems are skilled at crossexamination,1 45 and that the many Balkan-trained counsel seem "painfully
146 Such
awkward and unfocused on just what they are trying to accomplish.,
comparative ineptitude is hardly surprising in light of the professional
inexperience that, unfortunately, characterizes too many of the practicing
counsel who appear before the Tribunal. As noted by Michael G. Karnavas:
The complexity of the legal principles found in the Statute and Rules of the ICTY is not
beyond the ken of the criminal defense lawyer. Understanding of the Byzantine structure
of the UN, and the legal theories and historical evolution of international law, customs,
philosophies, quasi-precedents, etc., does, however, require extensive knowledge of
public international law ....
These points are mentioned because the list of attorneys on the defense panel come from
different legal traditions. Some have little or no criminal defense experience, let alone
knowledge of public international law. This poses a problem. The accused, if he/she
qualifies, is given a list of attorney names from which to choose his/her counsel. The
qualification required for defense counsel is minimal ....Given the high caliber of and
screening process47for the prosecution team, one must question the low qualifications for
defense counsel.

This lack of comprehension naturally trickles down to the clients whom
the attorneys are assigned to represent. This was precisely the problem in
Erdemovic. As noted, the Appeals Chamber granted Erdemovic the
opportunity to plead anew given the court's finding that his guilty plea was
not informed.1 48 In reaching this conclusion, the court focused much of its
attention on Erdemovic's counsel, observing that the defense attorney neither
understood the concept of a guilty plea nor comprehended the nature of the
charges against his client. Citing to portions of the defendant's initial
appearance, 149 sentencing, 150 and appellate hearing transcripts, 151 the court

144. D'Amato, supra note 125, at 465.
145. Michael G. Karnavas, The International Criminal Tribunal, THE CHAMPION, Dec. 1996,
Kamavas is a former public
http://www.criminaljustice.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/96decOl.htm.
defender at the state and federal level, and, for a brief period, represented a defendant before the ICTR.
146. Wald, supra note 122, at 104:
Understandably, the bulk of defense counsel are Balkan-trained lawyers and are typically
not experienced at cross-examination. Some are quick learners, but others are painfully
awkward and unfocused on just what they are trying to accomplish. They sometimes
argue with or even criticize the witnesses. They also go off on tangents that are not
always relevant to the case. The Tribunal is now operating training courses for appointed
lawyers, but, candidly, it is not easy to acculturate lawyers in a wholly new legal system
in a few days of lectures or even simulated exercises. As an American judge, I frankly
find many ICTY defense cross-examinations painfully unhelpful to my own judgement.
147. Karnavas, supra note 145; see also Michael G. Kamavas, Rwanda's Quest for Justice:
1997,
May
National and International Efforts and Challenges, THE CHAMPION,
http://www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/97may01.htm.
148. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-A, supra
note 36, § 4 (Disposition), paras. 3, 5.
149. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge
Vohrah, Case No. IT-96-22-A, supra note 39, para. 17.
150. Citing to Erdemovic's sentencing hearing, the court made the following observations:
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found that Erdemovic's plea was infirm given his counsel's
miscomprehensions, as well as the failure on the part of the Trial Chamber
and defense counsel to "adequately explain[] to him" the nature of the
charges. 152 Patricia M. Wald, former ICTY judge and U.S. Appeals Court
Moreover, it appears to us that defence counsel consistently advanced arguments
contradicting the admission of guilt and criminal responsibility implicit in a guilty plea. If
the defence had truly understood the nature of a guilty plea, it would not have persisted in
its arguments which were obviously at odds with such a plea. In his closing submissions
during the Sentencing Hearing, defence counsel urged that the uncorroborated evidence
of the Appellant alone was insufficient to ground a conviction. He argued:
Erdemovic's plea of guilty and the explanation given by his counsel must
be confirmed so that a Court can reach an objective and legally acceptable
judgement beyond any doubt. My intention was not to challenge
Erdemovic's plea on his behalf. However, according to the principle in
dubio prop reo, certain questions arose yesterday ....

[I]f there is any

shade of doubt in that answer to that question, then the decision of the
Court should go in favour of the accused Erdemovic, because regardless of
his plea of guilty, if his statement is not corroborated, the alleged crime
cannot be proved and the criminal responsibility cannot be established.
From his foregoing statement, defence counsel did not seem to appreciate that a guilty
plea had finally decided the issue of conviction or acquittal. Defence counsel was
apparently advancing arguments asserting insufficiency of evidence to convict the
Appellant and urging for an acquittal during a sentencing hearing after the Appellant had
pleaded guilty. Indeed, the Trial Chamber did nothing to dissuade defence counsel from
this course of action since it merely said that if the Appellant were to plead guilty, "the
trial will continue, but completely differently," and that he would have the opportunity to
explain attenuating circumstances. This intricate issue as to whether the defence asserted
arguments contradicting a guilty plea is dealt with further when we come to consider the
question as to whether the Appellant's plea was equivocal or not. However, it is clear to
us thus far that the Appellant did not understand the true nature and consequences of
making a guilty plea.
Id. para. 16.
151. Citing the transcript before the Appeals Chambers, the court noted:
There is no indication that the Appellant understood the nature of the charges. Indeed,
there is every indication that the Appellant had no idea what a war crime or a crime
against humanity was in terms of the legal requirements of either of these two offences.
Our conclusion is supported by what seems to have been some misapprehension on the
part of defence counsel himself as to the nature of the charges. When questioned by the
President of the International Tribunal during the hearing of 26 May 1997 as to the
elements of a war crime, the following exchange took place:
MR. BABIC: We did not have the option of war crime, because the
elements-all the elements of the criminal offence of the war crime were
not present. So we discussed that.
PRESIDENT CASSESE: Sorry. May I ask you-I did not understand you
correctly. You said that some elements of war crimes were not present.
Which elements of war crimes were not present?
MR. BABIC: Yes.
PRESIDENT CASSESE: Which ones?
MR. BABIC: The presence of the civilian population is not an element of
the war crime; it is an element of the crime against humanity.
PRESIDENT CASSESE: Do you mean to say that in an armed conflict,
whatever its classification, whether it is classified as internal or
international, the killing of civilians may not be regarded as a war crime? I
mean, if you go through the case law ofMR. BABIC: During combat operations, yes, during combat operations.
PRESIDENT CASSESE: All right. Thank you.
Defence counsel's statements would indicate a lack of understanding of the offence of a
war crime. We, therefore, hold that the Appellant did not understand the nature of the
charges he was facing nor the charge to which he pleaded guilty.
Id. para. 18.
152. Id.
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judge for the District of Columbia, echoed this general sentiment, asserting a
view sympathetic to that ultimately expressed in Erdemovic. Within a wider
contextual discussion of the ICTY and the political tensions in the Balkans,
Judge Wald noted that the defendants who appear before the Tribunal
frequently "do not really understand" the legal arguments they observe and, as
a result, "they resort to 'firing' their counsel in open court, giving the counsel
counterproductive instructions, or insisting on telling their stories at
strategically inopportune times."' 153 After recognizing that a knowledgeable
defense attorney "is the sine qua non of a fair trial," Judge Wald noted that
many Hague observers insist that incompetence underlies many of the
problems commonly associated with defense counsel representation.
Without question, the extent of attorney readiness and competence
largely dictates a defendant's comprehension level. Too often characterized by
an inadequate understanding of international humanitarian law, relative
inexperience with international criminal litigation, and a lack of familiarity
with the Tribunal's trial and dispute-resolution procedures, it is difficult to
accept the proposition that an attorney, when presented with a proffered plea
disposition, should be presumed to have rendered sound information and
advice to his client with respect to the various ramifications associated with
the plea. Rather, logic declares that an attorney, who is unlearned in the
complexities of the law and uncertain of the processes of the court, is unlikely
to explain thoroughly, accurately, and effectively to his client the array of
consequences attendant to a proposed plea disposition, let alone the merits and
demerits of such an option.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The function of the ICTY is not to ensure that defendants pursue the
most advantageous strategy. Rather, it is the Chamber's obligation to ensure
that its adjudicative processes satisfy due process expectations. Within the
context of Rule 62 bis, therefore, it is incumbent upon the ICTY to make
certain that the defendant who enters a guilty plea is sufficiently informed of
the attendant consequences and is not motivated by undue influences. As this
Article details, the problems associated with the guilty plea hearing process at
The Hague are rooted in the indefiniteness of Rule 62 bis. Accordingly, any
serious reform of the Rule 62 bis process must seek to harmonize inconsistent
judicial approaches by providing substantive guidelines for the Trial Chamber
to follow whenever a guilty plea is tendered. The guidelines delineated in
Erdemovic and, more particularly, Rule 11 of the U.S. Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide a useful starting point-useful because the
detailed criteria listed therein comprise the informational and volitional
components essential to a valid guilty plea. Rule lI's exhaustive delineation
of assessment criteria measuring the full range of factors underlying a
defendant's plea decision-his comprehension level of the various
153. Wald, supra note 122, at 106.
154. See id. at 102 (noting that "some commentators say there are even more profound
problems with defense counsel, involving issues of competence, integrity and accessibility to the
evidence and witnesses they need in order to play on a level field with the prosecution.").
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constitutional (trial) rights forfeited, the sentencing ramifications, and the
pertinent charges; the voluntary nature of his plea decision, including whether
his decision was unduly motivated by force, threats, or external promises; and
the existence of a supportive factual basis--encapsulates the guiding
principles necessary to gauge accurately the comprehension and volitional
state of a defendant contemplating a change of plea. Although the United
States and the ICTY share common problems with respect to guilty plea
procedure, 55 Rule 11 nevertheless provides an excellent framework with
which to assess the validity of a defendant's guilty plea.
First, Rule 62 bis should be amended to require explicitly that the
Chamber ensures during the change of plea process that the defendant is
informed of, and adequately understands, the various rights and consequences
associated with a plea of guilty. Specifically, the Chamber must make certain
that the defendant knows of the various trial rights that he is forfeiting, of the
Chamber's authority to ignore any sentencing recommendations and impose a
life sentence, of the elements of the offense(s) to which he is pleading guilty,
and of the factual basis in support of those charges. The court should also
ensure that the defendant is entering his guilty plea voluntarily, and that the
plea change is not unduly influenced by threats or inducements.156 Although it
is unnecessary for the Chamber to inform the defendant of each of these
components specifically, it is essential that the defendant be examined with
respect to these factors and that the Tribunal satisfy itself regarding the
defendant's awareness and familiarity with the process.
In addition, and of equal significance, the Chamber must require that
defendants personally detail their knowledge and awareness of each of these
items, beyond the monosyllabic responses that too often characterize current
Rule 62 bis practice. To better ensure the protection of defendants' due
process interests, the Tribunal must, in turn, require that the defendants
demonstrate on the record awareness of the items detailed in the amended
rule. When conducting this inquiry, the Chamber must be instructed to
prohibit or, at a minimum, greatly limit the employment of leading and
compound questions. 5 7 As detailed earlier in this Article, the monosyllabic
responses that invariably follow such questions are of limited probative value
given the context in which the questions are posed. Demanding a more robust
explanation from defendants regarding their understanding of the plea
agreement and related voluntariness issues will avoid judicial recitation of the
155. See supra notes 93-115 and accompanying text.
156. Each of these rights and consequences should be included within the statutory text. Thus,
the amended rule should require that the court examine the defendant with respect to the following: the
defendant's right to be presumed innocent and to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt; his
ight to call witnesses on his behalf; his right to examine the witnesses against him; his right to be tried
without undue delay; and his right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. In addition, the
court should ensure that the defendant is aware of and understands the maximum imprisonment term
(life); the elements of offense(s) to which he is pleading guilty; and the facts in support of the plea.
Finally, the court must be satisfied that the plea was entered into voluntarily and was not the product of
undue threats or inducements.
157. Consistent with this suggestion, the Chamber must refrain from providing elaborate plea
agreement summaries and factual descriptions. Rather, the court should examine the defendant regarding
such matters and require that the defendant sufficiently demonstrate comprehension of the agreement,
concurrence with the factual basis, and the voluntary nature of the decision to plead guilty.
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agreement and enhance the ability of judges to ascertain a defendant's mental
and volitional state. Admittedly, the adoption of such an approach will likely
elongate the Rule 62 bis process. However, considerations of fairness and due
process demand such a practice, especially given language barriers and the
unfamiliarity of defendants and many defense attorneys with the ICTY's trial
and plea bargaining processes.158
Finally, the ICTY must fortify its standards for the assignment of
defense counsel. In an apparent response to the identified ills associated with
indigent representation at The Hague, the ICTY recently enacted more
stringent representational standards, including a requirement that defense
counsel possess a minimum of seven years of relevant criminal litigative
experience and "a demonstrated competence in criminal law and/or
international criminal law/international humanitarian law/international human
rights law."' 59 Although an improvement upon the more generous standards
that had been in place since the Tribunal's inception, the revised standards
nevertheless constitute an ineffective response to the ongoing issue of
inadequate representation. Given the complexity of international litigation, at
least some international criminal litigation experience or otherwise
demonstrated competence in the field must become a prerequisite to practice
before the Tribunal. It should also be required that counsel have a
demonstrated knowledge of adversarial-style plea bargaining, including the
negotiation practices and procedures routinely employed at The Hague. By
mandating such relevant experience and familiarity, the Tribunal would
ensure that defendants benefit from counsel capable of vigorously and
effectively representing their interests at trial, of adequately assessing the
strengths and weaknesses associated with a trial strategy, and of ascertaining
and communicating the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences
associated with the pursuit of a proffered plea disposition.
If implemented, the suggested reforms will bring greater clarity,
consistency, and substance to a deeply flawed and infirm Rule 62 bis process.
As evidenced by the enactment of Rule 62 bis after the Appeals Chamber's
decision in Erdemovic, the ICTY has the demonstrated capability to adapt new
rules swiftly to accommodate perceived structural demands. With the clock
ticking away, however, and the close of the Tribunal's business just a few
years away, the ICTY must implement the necessary reforms before the lights
are turned out at the Tribunal-and on the defendants-in or around 2008.
V.

CONCLUSION

The horrific atrocities of the Balkan wars bordered on the unthinkable.
Widespread killings, displacements, sexual assaults, and physical destruction
characterized a series of conflicts that defy both logic and basic human
respect. With loved ones killed and families forever destroyed, the ethnic
tensions that predated the Balkan conflicts are likely to persist. Each
158. Moreover, any increase in time is small in comparison to the time that would have been
expended had the case been litigated.
159. See Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel, supra note 120, art. 14.
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defendant convicted at the Tribunal represents a sad element of this most

unfortunate human tragedy.
Although few predictions can be made with certainty, it can safely be
assumed that the case of Prosecutorv. Milosevic will not culminate in a plea
bargain. Yet for those defendants whose dispositions are finalized in such

fashion, it remains the duty-and, indeed, the calling-of a judicial body to
ensure that justice is rendered. Part of that duty involves the adoption of
procedures ensuring that every defendant-the innocent and the guilty alikehas his or her case decided fairly and impartially. Anything less would
necessarily impair the integrity of an entity holding itself out as a court of

justice.
Indeed, the ramifications attendant to such practices are likely to extend
far beyond the walls of the ICTY. The ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra

Leone (SCSL), the Ad-Hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor, and the
recently created International Criminal Court (ICC) all make specific
allowances for plea bargaining. It is expected that the Iraqi Special Tribunal
will also employ this method of dispute resolution. 16 Like Rule 62 bis, each
of the guilty plea statutes adopted by these tribunals only skeletally delineates
the factors relevant to the determination of a validly entered guilty plea. A
representative example is Article 65.1 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which
rather generally provides:
Where the accused makes an admission of guilt pursuant to article 64, paragraph 8:
1.

The Trial Chamber shall determine whether:
(a)

The accused understands the nature and consequences of the
admission of guilt;

(b)

The admission is voluntarily made by the accused after sufficient
consultation with defence counsel; and

(c)

The admission of guilt is supported by the facts of the case that are
contained in:
(i)

The charges brought by the Prosecutor and admitted by the
accused;

(ii)

Any materials presented by the Prosecutor which
supplement the charges and which the accused accepts; and

(iii)

of witnesses,
Any other evidence, such as the testimony
61
presented by the Prosecutor or the accused.'

The Court for East Timor, the ICTR, and the SCSL all have statutory
language that mirrors that of either Article 65.1 or Rule 62 bis. Like the ICTY
rule, both the ICTR and SCSL statutes simply require that a court, prior to
160. See Scharf, supra note 20, at 1071; Iraq Will Find Catharsis in the Trial of Saddam,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 2, 2004, available at 2004 WL 82003672 (noting that the prosecutors at the
Iraqi Tribunal are "hoping that plea bargaining will induce some of [Saddam Hussein's] henchmen...
to turn against him.").
161. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 65.1, U.N. Doc.
32/A/CONF. 183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, 1039 (1998).
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accepting a guilty plea, satisfy itself that the plea was entered "freely and
voluntarily," that the plea is informed and unequivocal, and that there is a
supporting factual basis.162 Like Article 65.1, the Court for East Timor merely
requires a judicial determination that the accused comprehends the "nature
and consequences of the admission of guilt," that the163guilty plea is entered
voluntarily, and that there is a supporting factual basis.
Given this uniform vagueness of statutory definition, each of these
international criminal tribunals is vulnerable to the same type of widespread
plea hearing irregularities that currently plague the ICTY. In fact, this
likelihood is enormously enhanced given the plethora of ICTY precedents.
Questions regarding the legitimacy of defendant challenges to guilty pleas will
forever be assessed against the backdrop of a wealth of Tribunal Chamber
practices that have been inconsistent in application, substantively incomplete,
and reflective of an institutional preference for facial appearances of propriety
over individual due process.
Since Erdemovic and the enactment of Rule 62 bis, and with the
business of the ICTY coming to a close in 2008, reform of the Tribunal's
162. The ICTR guilty plea statute provides:
(B)
If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62(A)(v), or requests to
change his plea to guilty, the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the guilty plea:
(i)
is made freely and voluntarily;
(ii)
is an informed plea;
(iii)
is unequivocal; and
(iv)
is based on sufficient facts for the crime and accused's participation in it,
either on the basis of objective indicia or of lack of any material
disagreement between the parties about the facts of the case.
ICTR R. P. & EvID. 62. The SCSL guilty plea statute provides:
(A) If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 61(v), or requests to change
his plea to guilty, the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the guilty plea:
i.
is made freely and voluntarily;
ii.
is an informed plea;
iii.
is unequivocal;
iv.
is based on sufficient facts for the crime and accused's participation in it,
either on the basis of independent indicia or of lack of any material
disagreement between the parties about the facts of the case.
SCSL R. P. & EVID. 62.
163. The East Timor guilty plea statute reads, in pertinent part:
Where the accused makes an admission of guilt in any proceedings before the
Investigating Judge, or before a different judge or panel at any time before a final
decision in the case, the court or judge before whom the admission is made shall
determine whether:
(a)
The accused understands the nature and consequences of the admission of
guilt;
(b)
The admission is voluntarily made by the accused after sufficient
consultation with defense counsel; and
(c)
The admission of guilt is supported by the facts of the case that are
contained in:
1.
The charges as alleged in the indictment and admitted by the
accused;
2.
Any materials presented by the prosecutor which support the
indictment and which the accused accepts; and
3.
Any other evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses, presented
by the prosecutor or the accused.
Section 29A.1 of the UNTAET Regulation 2000/30 on the Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure,
available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/reg200030.pdf.
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patently flawed guilty plea hearing practices seems to have become an interest
subsidiary to other institutional concerns. Yet with the ICC and the larger
world community looking on, it is essential that the ICTY reverse this course
and adopt plea procedures that are fair not only in appearance but also in fact.
With the credibility of the ICTY already in tatters among segments of the
Balkan population, 164 the Tribunal must not continue to employ plea
procedures that may further damage its already frayed reputation, tarnish its
standing in the larger world, and serve as an unfortunate precedent for future
international criminal courts. By amending Rule 62 bis in the manner
suggested, the ICTY can take a meaningful step toward refashioning a guilty
plea procedure very much in need of reform. Fair processes benefit
everybody: the innocent, the guilty, and the observing public. Hopefully, in
the near future, the world will witness a perceptible ICTY effort to put
fairness of procedure ahead of a rush to convict.

164. See Wald, supra note 122, at 106.
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